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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 19579

JULIO GARY VALDEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT Q F ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's
finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder in the
death of Christopher Swan?
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's

finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder in the
death of Carolyn Swan?
3.

Was the trial court's admission of evidence

obtained during the execution of two search warrants reversible
error?
5.

Did the trial court err in death qualifying the

6.

Should the trial court have quashed the jury venire

jury?

based upon alleged systematic exclusion of racial and ethnic
minorities from the venire?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Julio Gary Valdez, was charged by

,

information with two counts of first degree murder, a capital
offense, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1978) (amended 1983,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1984, 1985) (R. 125). A jury trial resulted in verdicts of
guilty as charged on both counts (R. 3229-30).

After a penalty

hearing, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict of
death on either count.

The trial court then sentenced defendant

to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison (R. 386-7).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Conflicting evidence was received at the trial of this
case.

The following evidence presented by the State supported

the jury's verdicts.
In 1978, Carolyn Swan, a thirteen-year old Salt Lake
City resident, became romantically involved with defendant, who
was nineteen years old at the time (R. 1251, 1265).
first and only boyfriend (R. 1251, 1260).

This was her

In March or April of

1981, Ms. Swan ran away from her parents1 home to live with
defendant in his apartment.

Shortly thereafter, her parents

located her there and had her transported by the police to the
juvenile authorities and then home (R. 1252-3, 1283, 1449-50).
Ms. Swan continued to see defendant, became pregnant by him, and
in October 1981 gave birth to a baby boy whom she named
Christopher Valdez 1

(R. 1258-9, 1268).

In April of 1981, defendant met April Alkire and moved
in with her one month later.

In December 1981, Alkire became

engaged to marry defendant (R. 1290, 1297).

During the period

* In the information charging defendant with first degree murder
and throughout the trial the child was referred to as Christopher
Swan (R. 125) . Accordingly, the State will use that name
throughout its brief.
-
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between April 1981 and August 1982 f Alkire saw Carolyn Swan on
numerous occasions at Alkire1s and defendant's residence.
1294, 1296-7, 1300).

(R.

On one such occasion in January 1982, Ms.

Swan entered their apartment without permission, confronted
Alkire, and screamed at defendant.

The incident ended when

defendant went outside with Swan and talked with her for 30 to 45
minutes (R. 1301-02, 1417-18).

On July 11 of that same yearf

when Swan spotted Alkire and defendant driving a Blazer on State
Street, she chased their vehicle with hers and purposely hit the
back end of it several times.

After Alkire made obscene gestures

toward Swan, defendant turned onto a side street where Swan drove
her car into the side of the Blazer.

Defendant, Alkire, and Swan

got out of their vehicles and the latter two began screaming at
each other.

Swan lunged at defendant and scratched him before

returning to her car and driving off (R. 1308-13).
After this incident with the Blazer, Alkire pressed
defendant to do something about Swan, indicating that if he did
not, Alkire would leave him.

She confronted him with information

she had obtained about a paternity suit Swan allegedly had filed
against him and urged him to hire an attorney to take care of
this (R. 1314-18).

On the morning of August 12, 1982, Alkire and

defendant fought over this situation before she left for work.
Later that day while Alkire was at work, she had a telephone
conversation with defendant in which he told her in a "cold"
voice that "all [her] problems were over and [his] hatd] just
begun" (R. 1321-2, 1324-7).

After work, Alkire returned home;

defendant, who worked a 3:00 p.m. to midnight shift, was not

-3-
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there (R. 1328) .

Once inside their apartment, Alkire looked for

a gun which, she testified, was about four feet long and in an
To Alkire 1 s

upstairs closet; however, she was unable to find it.
knowledge, this was the only gun in the apartment.

She then left

the apartment at approximately 6:30 p.m. to go shopping with her
mother and did not return until around 10:00 p.m.

She showered

and went to bed, falling asleep at about 11:00 p.m. (R. 1331-2,
1713).

Alkire had not had any contact with defendant the entire

day, except in the morning prior to leaving for work and the one
time at work by telephone (R. 1328, 1331).
On August 12 at the Swan residence on Doreen Street in N
Salt Lake City, where Carolyn Swan and her ten month old son,
Christopher, lived with her parents, Carolyn had at least one
telephone conversation with defendant (R. 1602-3).

During the

afternoon of that day, she told a friend who was visiting that
she planned to meet defendant later (R. 1412).

That evening, Ms.

Swan told her father that she was going to meet defendant at
approximately 12:30 a.m. the following morning at the corner of
Gordon Lane and Doreen Street, a common meeting place for her and
defendant about 200 feet from the Swan residence.

Several hours

before she left, Swan's father loaned her his wristwatch so that
she could keep track of the time.

She told him that she would

not wait for defendant for more than ten or fifteen minutes and
would not spend longer than that with him once he arrived (R.
1441, 1444, 1601, 1604) .
At 11:30 p.m., Carolyn entered her parents' bedroom
with Christopher and spoke with them.

-4-

She had put up her hair,
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had on perfume, and wore a plaid shirt and a pair of jeans—
clothes she saved for special occasions.
overalls and a striped shirt.
or the baby after that.

Christopher wore blue

Neither of Swan's parents saw her

However, her father thought he heard the

sound of a door at about midnight (R. 1263, 1438-9, 1443-4).
At approximately 12:15 a.m. on August 13, a police
officer driving home from work observed a woman with a small
infant in her arms standing on the corner of Doreen and Gordon
(R. 1470-8).

Shortly before this at about 12:06 a.m., defendant

punched out on his time card at his place of employment, Wheeler
Machinery Co., located at 4901 West 2100 South in Salt Lake
County (R. 1469, 1616).

At 1:30 a.m. near the intersection of

7000 South and 3200 West, a police officer pulled over defendant,
who was driving his pickup truck, and issued him a citation for
running a stop sign and displaying an expired registration
sticker.

Defendant was alone, and the officer did not observe

anything suspicious about either defendant or his truck (R. 14991510, 1527-30).

That same morning near 5:30 a.m., April Alkire

awoke, went upstairs, and found defendant sitting on the couch in
the living room of their apartment drinking beer.
in his work clothes.

He was still

Shortly thereafter, defendant told her a

story about a "hit man" who called him at work, shot Carolyn Swan
in a field, and then took the baby (R. 1683, 1686).
Subsequently, Alkire telephoned her mother and related the story
to her.

The two of them manufactured an alibi which had

defendant returning home after work in the early morning hours of
August 13, eating dinner with Alkire, going with her to Alkire1s

-5-
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parents1 residence and exchanging his pickup truck for a Blazer
that was there, and then returning home.

After Alkire suggested

this alibi to defendant and rehearsed it with him, defendant made
the switch of his truck for the Blazer and drove home in the
Blazer that night after work (R. 1642-4, 1692-9, 1748-50).
On the morning of August 13, Carolyn Swan's parents
awoke to find her and Christopher missing.
been slept in.

Their beds had not

An inventory of their belongings revealed that

neither had taken any footwear with them, none of Christopher's
foodstuffs were missing, and no luggage was gone (R. 1597-1600).
Later that day Swan's father went to Wheeler Machinery, found

v

defendant, and asked him if he knew where Carolyn and Christopher
were.

After initially denying that he had plans to meet them the

night before, defendant acknowledged that a meeting had been
arranged but had never taken place.

He told Mr. Swan that he had

not seen them and did not know where they were (R. 16 07-8).
After meeting with Swan's parents in the evening of
August 13, Scott Miller, a deputy sheriff, contacted defendant by
telephone at Wheeler Machinery and questioned him about his
relationship with Carolyn Swan and whether he knew of her or her
son's whereabouts.

Defendant first denied having any contact

with Swan on August 12, but then indicated that she had called
him several times at work.

He repeatedly said that he did not

know where Carolyn and Christopher were, explaining that after
leaving work the prior evening he had gone straight home except
for a brief stop at a convenience store.

After arriving home and

eating dinner with his girlfriend, April Alkire, the two of them
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had gone to bed (R. 1802-8).

Two days laterf Miller, accompanied

by a pair of detectives with the sheriff's department,
interviewed Alkire and defendant at their residence.

During this

interview, in which both defendant and Alkire appeared extremely
nervous, defendant told the officers essentially the same story
about his activities after work on August 12 that he had
previously related to Miller; however, he added that after
dinner, he and Alkire had gone to Alkire's mother's residence and
exchanged his pickup truck for a Blazer (R. 1811-14, 1839).
Subsequently and pursuant to permission given them by defendant,
police officers searched defendant's truck which was still at
Alkire's mother's address.

The officers gathered soil samples

from the truck's fender wells and debris from the floor mats (R.
1670-2, 1815-6, 1824-5, 1830).

On August 16, the police

impounded defendant's truck and searched it again pursuant to a
warrant on August 18, recovering more soil samples from the
fender wells and additional debris from the interior (R. 2396-7,
2377-80) .
On August 19, flood control workers on the Jordan River
found Christopher Swan's decomposed body, face down in the water,
caught in a headgate on the river at approximately 2100 South (R.
1876, 1892, 1895-6).
April Alkire.

That same day, police officers arrested

After receiving a grant of immunity, she made a

statement to the police which differed from prior statements
(which contained the alibi noted earlier) she had previously
given them.

Also, she gave the police permission to search her

and defendant's apartment

(R. 1709-11, 1349).

-7-

On August 20,
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officers executed a search warrant on that apartment and seized a
gun case from an upstairs hall closet and several live .270
caliber rifle cartridges (R. 1910 f 1913, 1921).

They also

arrested defendant that day (R. 3).
On August 22 f Carolyn Swan's body was discovered under
a scrub oak in an abandoned area of Lark, Utah (R. 2010-21, 20468).

Police officers investigating the scene found the following

evidence:

a spent .270 caliber cartridge located a short

distance away from a large dried blood spot on the ground which
contained what appeared to be bullet fragments and clothing
fibers; and a trail of blood from that blood spot down a path to
where Swan's decomposed body lay.

Swan wore her father's

wristwatch, but she was not wearing any shoes (R. 1980-9, 2003,
2085) .
At trial, Jerry Thompson, a homicide detective,
testified that he performed a number of timed runs in his car
over various routes from Wheeler Machinery (defendant's place of
employment) to the corner of Doreen and Gordon (where Carolyn and
Christopher Swan were to meet defendant), to the location in Lark
where Carolyn's body was found, to a nearby access on the Jordan
River at 7 800 South (where defendant could have thrown
Christopher into the river), and back to the point where
defendant was stopped and issued a traffic citation at 1:30 a.m.
on August 13.

Those runs, which were made between 11:00 p.m. and

12:30 a.m. and within the speed limits, indicated that defendant
could have left work shortly after punching out at 12:06 a.m. on
August 13, driven the route described, and been at the point of .-t
the traffic stop by 1:30 a.m. (R. 1544-93).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter-8Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Monique Ryserf the state medical examiner, testified
that Carolyn Swan died from gunshot wounds to the chest and the
back of the neck, and that, given the condition of her body when
found, she had been killed within a day of the last time she was
seen alive—i.e., 11:30 p.m. on August 12.

Ryser also testified

that Christopher Swan had died from drowning within 24 hours of
the last time he was seen alive on August 12 (R. 2358-9).

After

giving a detailed account of what happens to the body of a
drowning victim in the water, Ryser then noted that the abrasions
evident on top of the baby's head were consistent with it having
scraped along the bottom of the river as the body drifted
downstream (R. 2354-7, 2361). 2
Donald Havekost, an agent assigned to the elemental
analysis unit of the F.B.I. Laboratory, testified that, after he
analyzed the lead fragments recovered from the blood spot at the
scene of Ms. Swan's killing and the lead bullets contained in
several of the .270 cartridges seized from defendant's residence,
he concluded that they had all come from the same batch of lead
used in the manufacturing process (R. 2117, 2143-8).

An

associate of Havekost further testified that the cloth fibers
found in the blood spot were from Ms. Swan's shirt (R. 1663-4).

z

Testimony was presented at trial which established that the
Jordan River, which flows south to north, had a pea or sewer
gravel bottom (gravel up to one inch in size) at 7 800 South which
gradually became a muddy bottom downstream from that point (R.
1881-2, 2600), and that in August 1982 nothing in the river
between 7 800 South and 2100 South, including a diversion canal
between 4500 and 4800 South, would present an impassable obstacle
to a body the size of Christopher's (R. 2318-23, 2336).

-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Paul Schrecker, an agent assigned to the firearms
identification unit of the F.B.I* Laboratory, testified thatf
after examining "mechanism marks" 3 on the spent .270 cartridge
recovered in the area of Ms. Swan's killing and on three of the
.270 cartridges seized from defendant's residence, he concluded
that all had been in and out of the same firearm at some time.
He also noted that gunshot residue found around a hole in the
upper back portion of Ms. Swan's shirt indicated that she was
shot at very close range (R. 217 5-2215).
James Stephens, a mineralogist working for Kennecott,
testified that, based upon his examination of soil samples taken
from defendant's truck and the area in Lark where Ms. Swan's body
was found, he believed it was "reasonably probable" both samples
had come from the same place (R.2423-54).
Michelle Garrick, an investigator for the Department of
Social Services, testified that she telephoned defendant in June
1982 and told him that Carolyn Swan had named him as
Christopher's father.

After defendant denied being Christopher's

father, Garrick informed him that the case would be referred to
the county attorney's office.

When asked whether he wished to be

served with a summons and complaint for the paternity action at
work or at home, defendant indicated that he preferred to be
served at home and then gave Garrick a false home address (R.
2242-5).

Sandy Mooy, an attorney with the Salt Lake County

Attorney's Office, verified that his office had filed a paternity
-9

3

According to Schrecker, "mechanism marks" refer to marks left
on ammunition by the mechanisms of a weapon (R. 2185).
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action against defendant, but that defendant had not been served
(R. 2286-2300).
Finallyf the State introduced evidence of outstanding
maternity bills for Ms. Swan at L.D.S. Hospital, which defendant
had failed to pay although he had promised to do so (R. 20882102) .
Defendant took the stand at trial and related the
following version of the facts.

He met Carolyn Swan in 1977 and

had, in his words, an "up and down" relationship with her between
1977 and 1982, which included several unpleasant confrontations
between the two of them and between April Alkire and Swan.

He

verified the incidents with Swan, testified to by April Alkire,
when Swan entered his apartment and confronted him and Alkire,
and when Swan accosted him and Alkire as they drove along State
Street (R. 1301-2, 1309-12, 2644-6).

Defendant admitted that it

was "highly possible" that Christopher Swan was his child (R.
2622-38) .
On August 13, 1982, in accordance with a plan created
by April Alkire and her mother to "scare" Carolyn Swan, defendant
left work shortly after midnight and drove his truck to the
corner of Doreen Street and Gordon Lane where he picked up
Carolyn and Christopher Swan and took them to an isolated area in
Lark, Utah.

There, a car approached defendant's truck.

A man

got out of the car, walked over to where defendant, Carolyn, and
Christopher were, and asked for identification.

After defendant

and Carolyn exited defendant's truck, Carolyn began screaming at
the man, who then shot her with a rifle.

-11-

When defendant ran
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toward the manf he pointed the rifle at defendant, grabbed
Christopher out of the cab of defendant's truck, and left in his
car.

Defendant never saw the baby again.

Defendant then left

the scene, and on his way home, was stopped by a police officer
and issued a traffic citation.
had happened (R. 2670-88).

Once home, he told Alkire what

Subsequently, defendant discovered

that his rifle was missing; but he saw it again when Alkire
retrieved it from her mother's home, sawed it into small pieces
with a hacksaw, and disposed of it.

Defendant acknowledged that,

after arriving home on August 13, he went along with an alibi for
himself which was created by Alkire and her mother and involved
the exchange of his truck for a Blazer at Alkire's mother's
residence (R. 2690-6) .
Defendant testified that, in August 1982, he owned only
one gun, a .270 caliber rifle, which he kept in his residence (R.
2617-8).

He identified the gun case police officers had seized

from his apartment as the one in which he kept his rifle.

He

also identified the seized ammunition pouch containing .270
caliber cartridges as his (R. 2619-20, 2670).

On cross-

examination, defendant admitted that he had denied fathering
Christopher Swan to an investigator with the Department of Social
Services and had given her a false address when asked where the
summons and complaint in a paternity action could be served.
further admitted that he had been aware of the possibility of
this paternity action against him—the loss of which would
obligate him to support Christopher, had never legally
acknowledged or obligated himself to Christopher, had only

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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He

infrequently given small sums of money to Ms. Swan for
Christopherfs support, and had recognized that as long as Ms.
Swan and Christopher were around he would be faced with social
interference and the possibility of additional financial
obligations (R. 2740-9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support
both of defendant's first degree murder convictions.

Because

defendant effectively asks the Court to reevaluate the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, something it
has repeatedly declined to do on review, his insufficiency claims
are without merit.
Because the photographs of the victims' bodies were
relevant to proving the charges against defendant and were not
overly prejudicial, the trial court did not commit error when it
admitted those photographs into evidence.
Defendant fails to show that evidence seized from
defendant's vehicle and his residence during the execution of two
search warrants was unlawfully seized.

Furthermore, he makes no

showing that exclusion of the allegedly tainted evidence likely
would have produced a result more favorable to him at trial.
The issue defendant raises concerning death
qualification of the jury was considered and decided against
defendant in State v. Mooref 697 P.2d 233 (Utah 1985).

Because

that decision is in accordance with the majority, and better,
view, this Court should again reject the argument defendant
advances.
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Finally, because defendant presented an inadequately
supported motion to quash the venire and failed to establish a
prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the
trial court properly denied that motion*

POINT I
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS.
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's
verdicts.

His individual attacks on the two first degree murder

convictions will be dealt with separately below.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction, this Court has applied the
following standard of review:
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the evidence
properly presented at trial in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, and will
only interfere when the evidence is so
lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable
man could not possibly have reached a verdict
beyond a reasonable doubt. We also view in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict
those facts which can be reasonably inferred
from the evidence presented to it.
State v. McCardell. 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) (citation
omitted).

As noted in State v. Booker. 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 26

(Oct. 25, 1985):
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." S£aJt£
v. Lammr Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);
ancord State v. Linden. Utah, 657 P.2d 1364,
1366 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter -14Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.
Id. at 28 (citation omitted).

And, even if the Court views the

evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be
upheld.

State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

In short,

"on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the
version of the facts which supports the verdict."

State v.

Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985), citing State v. Howell.
649 P.2d at 93.
A.
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1) (b) , (f), and (h)
(1978) (amended Supp. 1985), the State charged that defendant
"intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Christopher N.
Swan under the following circumstances:

(a) At the time the

homicide was committed the defendant also committed another
homicide; or (b) The defendant committed the homicide for
pecuniary or other personal gain; or (c) The defendant committed
the homicide for the purpose of preventing a witness from
testifying, or a person from providing evidence or from
participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation"
(R. 125) .

The jury was instructed accordingly (Instruction Nos.

1, 21, 26; R. 3238-9, 3257, 3263-4).

On appeal, defendant argues

that his conviction on that charge should be reversed because the
evidence was insufficient to support it in three respects:

(1)

inadequate proof that defendant was Christopher's killer, (2)
inadequate proof that defendant intentionally or knowingly caused

-15Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Christopher's death, and (3) inadequate proof on two of the three
aggravating circumstances alleged.
First, in claiming that there was insufficient evidence
to support the jury's finding that he killed Christopher,
defendant ignores two basic principles of appellate review:

that

circumstantial evidence alone may be competent to establish the
guilt of the accused. State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah
1982), and that the trier of fact is not obligated to believe the
evidence most favorable to the defendant rather than that
presented in opposition by the State.
at 97.

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d

In his brief, defendant does little more than urge the

Court to disbelieve the testimony of certain State's witnesses
and accept somewhat conflicting evidence favorable to him (see
Brief of Appellant at 15-19).

The State offered the testimony of

Officer Thompson concerning driving times, that of Judy Dencker
about her observation of a woman and a child in the early morning
hours of August 13, and that of Ralph Gisseman regarding the
possibility of a child's body being caught in a diversion
structure in the Jordan River at approximately 4600 South, in
support of its theory that defendant left work shortly after
midnight on August 13, drove to the corner of Doreen Street and
Gordon Avenue where he picked up Carolyn and Christopher Swan,
took the Swans to a point in Lark where he shot and killed
Carolyn, then drove a short distance to the Jordan River where he
threw Christopher into the water, and was stopped by a police
officer in the vicinity of 7000 South and 3200 West for a traffic
violation at 1:30 a.m.

Because defendant fails to show that the
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testimony of these witnesses, or of any other Wat State witnesses
offered in support of this theoryf was wholly improbable, his
argument, which asks this Court to substitute its judgment for
that of the jury in weighing the evidence and assessing the
credibility of witnesses, is entirely without merit.

Moreover,

it is difficult to understand how defendant can seriously attack
the driving time testimony put on by the State or the testimony
of Dencker when defendant, in his own testimony, substantiated
the accuracy of the State's evidence.
Second, defendant's argument that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that he intentionally or knowingly
caused Christopher's death is meritless.

In a criminal case,

intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
the surrounding circumstances.
1223 (Utah 1983) .

State v. Murphy. 674 P.2d 1220,

That defendant picked up Carolyn and

Christopher Swan in the early morning hours of August 13, 1982
and drove them to Lark and that they were not seen again until
their bodies were recovered six and nine days later is
undisputed.

The medical examiner who performed an autopsy on

Christopher testified that, in her opinion, he was alive when
placed in the river and died of drowning.

She estimated that at

the time his body was found it had been in the river
plus or minus a few days" (R. 2358-09).

n

a week,

These circumstances,

coupled with evidence that Carolyn had been killed by gunshots
shortly after she was last seen, provide an adequate basis from
which the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant
intentionally or knowingly killed Christopher in conjunction with
intentionally killing Carolyn.
-17-
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Finally, defendant attacks the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances of homicide
"committed for pecuniary or other personal gain" and homicide
"committed for the purpose of preventing a witness from
testifying, or a person from providing evidence, or a person from
participating in any legal proceedings or official
investigation."

With respect to the first of these aggravating

circumstances, defendant again asks the Court to ignore credible
evidence presented by the State and to accept a version of the
facts most favorable to him.

As noted in this brief's statement

of facts, the State introduced substantial evidence of
defendant's significant financial obligations toward Christopher,
defendant's failure to pay for Christopher's support, a paternity
suit filed against defendant regarding Christopher and
defendant's efforts to avoid it, and defendant's denial of having
fathered the boy.

Moreover, defendant himself admitted at trial

that, although it was "highly possible" he was Christopher's
father, he denied paternity to government officials and to his
fiancee, and he never legally acknowledged or obligated himself
to the child.

He further testified that he only infrequently

gave Ms. Swan small sums of money for Christopher's support, that
he realized a paternity suit, if lost, would mean that he would
be legally obligated for child support, and that as long as
Carolyn and Christopher were around he would be faced with social
interference and possible financial obligations.

This evidence

adequately supported the aggravating circumstance of killing for
pecuniary or personal gain.
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For many of the same reasonsf the evidence was also
sufficient to support the second aggravating circumstance.

The

very existence of Christopher would provide evidence in a
paternity action against defendant.

Furthermoref his existence

could well have tied defendant to the killing of Carolyn Swan.
In light of the evidence showing that there was a paternity
action filed against defendant, that Christopher was with Carolyn
the last time she was seen alive, and that defendant killed
Carolyn, the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant
killed Christopher by throwing him into the river to prevent that
"person from providing evidence . . .

or from participating in

any legal proceedings or official investigation."

The evidence,

when viewed in its entirety, was legally sufficient to support
that conclusion.
In sum, because the evidence was sufficient to support
the jury's findings that defendant was the person who killed
Christopher Swan and that he did so intentionally or knowingly
under either or both of the aggravating circumstances defendant
attacks on appeal, his conviction of first degree murder for the
death of Christopher Swan should be upheld.
B.
Under § 76-5-202(1) (a) and (h) , the State charged that
defendant "intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Carolyn
J. Swan under the following circumstances:

(a) At the time that

the homicide was committed the defendant also committed another
homicide; or (b) The defendant committed the homicide for the
purpose of preventing a witness from testifying, or a person from
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providing evidence or from participating in any legal proceedings
or official investigation" (R. 125). The jury was instructed
accordingly (Instruction Nos. 1, 21, 24; R. 3238-9, 3257, 3260)
Based upon the foregoing discussion of defendant's
sufficiency claim concerning his conviction for murdering
Christopher Swan, defendant's further claim that there was
insufficient evidence to support his first degree murder
conviction in the death of Carolyn Swan may be disposed of fairly
quickly.

_
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient

evidence to support the double homicide circumstance.

However,

in making this claim, defendant once again asks the Court to
invade the province of the jury by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the State's evidence in support of its theory that
defendant left work shortly after midnight on August 13, 1982 and
subsequently killed Carolyn and Christopher Swan—a function this
Court has repeatedly refused to perform.

Thus, for the reasons

previously discussed, defendant's claim should be rejected.
Defendant next argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he killed Carolyn to prevent
her from participating in a paternity action against him. Again,
defendant chooses to ignore ample evidence presented by the State
concerning a paternity action filed against defendant by the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office, defendant's awareness of that
fiction, his attempt to avoid the action, his denial of paternity
to a government official, and his failure to meet various
financial obligations to Christopher.

-20-
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somewhat conflicting evidence which, he claims, must have raised
a reasonable doubt in the jurors minds.

This, of course, ignores

the well settled principle that this Court will not reverse a
conviction on sufficiency grounds merely because contradictory
evidence or conflicting inferences exist.
97.

Howell, 649 P.2d at

Therefore, defendant's sufficiency claim regarding this

second aggravating circumstance is also without merit.
Accordingly, the Court should affirm defendant's first degree
murder conviction for the death of Carolyn Swan.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF
THE VICTIM'S BODIES INTO EVIDENCE WAS NOT
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to
prevent the State from introducing into evidence at trial
photographs of the victims' bodies (R. 248, 375-80).

The trial

court heard argument on the motion, took it under advisement, and
later denied it (R. 670-85, 2907).

At trial, defendant objected

to the admission of State's Exhibits 34 and 59, photographs of
the bodies of Carolyn and Christopher Swan, but stated that he
had no objection to State's Exhibit 60, a photograph of a watch
on Ms. Swan's wrist (R. 1651, 1865, 1960).

On appeal, defendant

argues that the trial court's admission of these three
photographs constituted reversible error.

Because defendant

stated at trial that he had no objection to Exhibit 60 and thus
did not preserve an objection to that photograph, see Utah R.
Evid. 103(a)(1); State v. MnCardell f 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah
1982), the State will address defendant's argument only insofar
as it relates to the admission of Exhibits 34 and 59.
-21-
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It is well settled that "[tlhe trial court's ruling on
the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to
create a likelihood that injustice resulted."

State v. Royball.

17 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Sept. 3, 1985) f citing State V,
McCardell . 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982).

With respect to the

admission of photographs like those at issue here, this Court in
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), set forth the following
rule:
We have frequently stated and applied
the rule that color photographs of the body
of the victim—even photographs that are
gruesome—are not inadmissible if they are
probative of essential facts, even though
they may be cumulative of other evidence.
663 P.2d at 63.

The Court added that "the key consideration in

the application of this rule has been the relevance of the
photographs."

Xbid.

Finally, it stated that the relevance of

the proposed photographs must be weighed against the risk of
creating undue prejudice:

#

[Tlhe court should determine whether the
viewing of the photographs by the jury would
create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice against the defendant, and if so,
whether that danger substantially outweighs
the photographs1 essential evidentiary value.
The more inflammatory the photograph, the
greater the need to establish its essential
evidentiary value, Commonwealth v.
Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. at 381, 317 A.2d at
226, and, conversely, the more essential the
evidentiary value of the photograph, the
greater the defendant's burden to require its
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory
nature would be prejudicial to him. The
point of the reference to "essential
evidentiary value" in the context of
potentially prejudicial photographs of the
victim's body is that such photographs would
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generally be inappropriate where the only
relevant evidence they convey can be put
before the jury readily and accurately by
other means not accompanied by the potential
prejudice.
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original).

Having articulated these

rules, the Garcia Court went on to hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting four photographs which
showed different angles of a homicide victim bloodied by stab
wounds.

It concluded that those photographs, although gruesomef

were not overly prejudicial and were relevant to show the area
where a witness saw the defendant drop the body, to show the
nature of the victims wounds and thus the defendant's state of
mind, and to corroborate ^

an expert witness's testimony that

there was not enough blood on the ground for the stabbing to have
occurred where the body was found,

ibid.

In its memorandum response to defendant's motion in
limine and during oral argument to the trial court (R. 677-82f
2939-47), the State argued that the photograph of Christopher's
body was highly relevant to showing:

(1) that the baby had been

thrown into the river alive (which would be probative of
defendant's state of mind) f

(2) the length of time the body had

been in the water (which would be probative on the issue of
whether he was killed at approximately the same time as Carolyn
was killed), and (3) that the baby had been thrown into the river
in the same clothing he wore the last time he was seen alive
(which also would be probative on the issue of when the killings
occurred).

Additionally, the photograph would corroborate expert

testimony indicating that the abrasions on the top of the child's
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head suggested that it had scraped along the bottom of the river
as the child floated downstream.

As for the photograph of

Carolyn's bodyf in addition to showing the amount of time the
body had been at the place of discovery (which is relevant to the
question of whether her death occurred near the time of
Christophers) , it illustrated the position of the body
underneath a scrub oak to which it had been dragged—something
that would clearly be relevant to defendant's state of mind.
Under these circumstances and given that the photographs could
not be considered any more "gruesome" than those at issue in
Garciflf the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the photographs into evidence.

In shortf if there was no

reversible error in Garcia, it is difficult to conceive of any
error here.
Moreover, even if the trial court did err in admitting
the challenged photographs, the error was harmless.

There simply

is no reasonable likelihood that without the error there would
have been a result more favorable to defendant.

State v. Wells,

603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979) . £££ al^Q. State v. Purcell, 15
Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 31 (Aug. 8, 1985); State v, Hutchison/ 655
P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid. 103(a) (1985); Utah R.
Crim. P. 30(a) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-30(a) (1982)).
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO PRESENT ANY GROUNDS FOR
REVERSING HIS CONVICTION BASED UPON THE
ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE SEIZED DURING
THE EXECUTION OF TWO ALLEGEDLY INVALID SEARCH
WARRANTS.
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Defendant argues that the trial court committed error
in refusing to suppress before trial and later admitting at trial
certain evidence he claims was seized by police officers pursuant
to two invalid search warrants—one issued and executed on August
18, 1982 for the search of defendant's impounded truck and one
issued and executed on August 20, 1982 for the search of
defendant's and April Alkire's residence.

Specifically,

defendant contends that, because the affidavits of a police
officer that supported the warrants contained known
misrepresentations of factf the warrrants were invalid and thus
soil samples, a gun case, and rifle cartridges seized during the
execution of the warranty should have been suppressed.

However,

this Court need not reach the question of possible
misrepresentations in the affidavits in order to resolve the
suppression issue.
First, with respect to the soil sample challenged by
defendant, it was not seized pursuant to the vehicle warrant.

In

his brief, defendant cites to T. 1717 (R. 2454) of the trial
transcript to identify the soil sample he claims was improperly
admitted over his objection.

Brief of Appellant at 3 8.

However,

that soil sample, which was marked as State's Exhibit 29, was
obtained during the search of defendant's truck conducted
pursuant to defendant's permission on August 15, 1982, not during
the vehicle search conducted on August 18 pursuant to the warrant
defendant challenges (R. 1671, 2454).

Because defendant does not

challenge the validity of the consent search on the 15th, his
argument concerning the soil sample he identifies is without
merit.
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Second, although the gun case and rifle cartridges were
seized during the execution of the residence warrant defendant
challenges, the trial court refused to suppress those items
pretrial not only because it found the warrant valid, but also on
the alternative ground that the search of the residence was
lawfully conducted pursuant to consent for the search given to
the police by April Alkire (R. 514-5, 554; Amended Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law—R. 3093).4

At trial, defendant did

not challenge the pretrial ruling concerning consent when the gun
case and rifle cartridges were offered as evidence, nor does he
challenge that ruling here (R. 1346, 2131).

Therefore, even

assuming, arguendo, that defendant's contention concerning the
defects in the affidavit supporting the warrant is correct, the
trial court, which had before it nothing more than defendant's
general objections to the gun case and rifle cartridges,^ could
have properly admitted those items at trial on the ground that
they were validly seized pursuant to a consent search—a ground
defendant does not ask this Court to review.

4

Defendant's pretrial motions to suppress were heard and decided
by Judge James S. Sawaya, a district court judge, who did not
preside over defendant's trial (Judge Banks sat for trial).
5

There is some question whether defendant adequately objected to
the admission of those items at trial. As previously noted,
Judge Banks, who presided at trial, did not hear or decide
defendant's pretrial motions to suppress. In order to have given
Judge Banks an opportunity to consider adequatly defendant's
objections, defendant should have entered more specific
objections than ones based merely on prior motions (R. 1346-7,
2131). £££ State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81-2 (Utah 1983); Utah
R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (1985).

-26-
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Finally, although defendant argues that it was error
for the trial court not to suppress this evidence, he completely
fails to address the critical question of whether this alleged
error would require reversal.

In that "ttlhe trial court's

ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed
absent a showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as
to create a likelihood that injustice resulted," State v.
Royball. 17 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Sept. 3, 1985), defendant is
obligated to show that without the error there would have been a
result more favorable to him.

State v. Purcell, 15 Utah Adv.

Rep. 30, 32 (Aug. 8, 1985); State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636
(Utah 1982); Utah R. Evid 103(a) (1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
£££ SlJSa State v. Griffin. 626 P.2d 478, 483 (Utah 1981)
(Wilkins, J., concurring in the result) (holding that
introduction of fruits of unlawful search and seizure was
harmless error, in that there was sufficient untainted evidence
to sustain the defendants' convictions).

In the absence of any

argument from defendant on this question, it must be assumed that
he is unable to advance an effective claim of reversible error.
For the reasons stated above, defendant's assignments
of error are without merit.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR WHEN IT
DEATH QUALIFIED THE JURY.
In Point IV of his brief, defendant argues that the
tfial court erred in death qualifying the jury in accordance with
Utah and federal law, s&S. State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah
1985), £itins UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-18 (e) (10) (1982) and
-27-
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Witherspoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510 (1968), because death
qualification allegedly creates juries that are unrepresentative
of the community at large and conviction prone.

An identical

argument was considered and rejected by this Court in State v.
Moore. 697 P.2d at 237-8.

Defendant argues that MoQJL£ was

wrongly decided, but presents no more compelling authority for
his position than was presented to the Court in Moore (see Brief
of Appellant in State v. Moore. Case No. 18737, at 16-26).

His

citation to Grigsby v. Mabry. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.

granted, suh nom. Lockhart v. McCree (case No. 84-1865),
U.S.
position.

(1985),

is to a case that represents a clear minority v

The majority, and better reasoned, view is that

adopted in Moore and by numerous courts throughout the country.

£££, e.g.r Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th cir. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Morales. 494 A.2d 367, 374-5 (Pa. 1985);

Commonwealth v. Boggsr 331 S.E. 2d 407, 417 (va. 1985); People v.
Collins and Bracey, 106 111.2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267, 285-6 (1985);
State v. Blount, 472 A.2d 1340, 1346-7 (Del. Sup. 1984); £gapl£
v. Fields. 35 Cal.3d 329, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680

:

(1983); Hovey v. Superior Court. 28 Cal. 3d 1, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128, 616 P.2de 1301 (1980).

Accordingly, the Court should reject

defendant's argument as having been properly disposed of in
VLQQUZ.

6

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this
case and will likely resolve the death qualification issue
presented by defendant.
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Although in Part D of his Point IV defendant complains
about how the process of death qualification worked to exclude
one prospective juror, he does not appear to argue that her
exclusion constituted reversible error.

He appears to use her

only as an example of how the process works.

In any eventf a

review of the record indicates that she was properly excluded for
cause (R. 1081-90).

SPE Wainwright v. Witt,

U.S.

, 105

S.Ct. 844 (1985).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY VENIRE.
During jury selectionf defendant filed a motion to have
the entire jury venire quashed on the basis of an alleged
systematic exclusion of racial and ethnic minorities from venires
in Salt Lake County in violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement.

(R. 3176-82).

After a brief discussion on the

motionf the trial court denied it (R. 1150-2).

On appeal,

defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error
in not granting a hearing on the motion and in denying it.
Neither of these claims is meritorious.
As an initial matter, the inadequacy of the motion
itself would justify the court's action.

The figures relied

upon

in defendant's motion to support the contention that Salt Lake
County's process of selecting jury panels from the voter rolls
results in an impermissible, systematic exclusion of Hispanics
from those panels were completely undocumented.
other verifying documents were attached.

No affidavits or

Under these

circumstances, any court would be justified in summarily denying
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter
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the motion.

Furthermore, defendant cannot fairly argue on appeal

that the trial court committed a procedural error in not holding
a hearing on the motion when defendant failed to even request a
hearing on the matter (R. 1150-2) f 3176-82).

See State v.

Steggell. 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) (the Court will not
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal).

Defendant

effectively asked the Court to quash the jury venire on the basis
of his written motion alone.
Even if the accuracy of defendant's figures is assumed,
the trial court did not improperly deny the motion to quash.

It

is well settled that in order to establish a prima facie
violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section
requirement, a defendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is
a "distinctive" group in the community; (2)
that the representation of this group in
venires from which juries are selected is not
fair and reasonable in relation to the number
of such persons in the community; and (3)
that this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the
jury-selection process.
Dnren v. Missouri. 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

Assuming, for

purposes of argument, that Hispanics are a "distinctive group" in
the community, see People v. Harris. 36 Cal.3d 36, 201 Cal. Rptr.
782, 679 P.2d 433, 440-1 (1984), the statistics cited by
defendant fail to show a violation of the second and third prongs
of the HjULLfiH test.

Defendant focuses entirely on a comparative
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disparity figure of 56.6% 7 to support his claim that there is
unconstitutional underrepresentation of Hispanics on jury panels
in Salt Lake County.

However, comparative disparity should not

be the only figure considered.

The more important figure is

absolute disparity—that is, the difference between the
percentage of eligible Hispanics in the community and the
percentage of Hispanics on the jury panels.

2&S. United States v.

EafSUr 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1984), si&lt.

denied. 104 S.Ct.

217 9.

As noted by the Hafen court:
Although we acknowledge the possibility
that the comparative disparity calculation
might be a useful supplement to the absolute
disparity calculation in some circumstances,
we do not believe that it necessarily
produces a more accurate result where, as
here, the group allegedly underrepresented
forms a very small proportion of the total
population. In fact, the smaller the group
is, the more the comparative disparity figure
distorts the proportional representation.
For example, in an area that had 500,000
whites and only one black eligible to serve
as jurors, a random selection system that
failed to place the single black on the
master wheel would produce a 100 per cent
comparative disparity, even though an all
white jury would clearly form a "fair cross
section" of the community. We agree with the
conclusions of the court in United States v,
Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1974), that
the comparative disparity calculation "is
ordinarily inappropriate where a very small
proportion of the population is black" and

1

Although defendant does not cite the source of his formula for
calculating comparative disparity (Brief of Appellant at 69, n.
13), the State will assume, for purposes of this brief, that it
is an acceptable formula. 5J£E People v. Sepeda, 581 P.2d 723,
728 (Colo. 1978). However, the Court should be aware that at
least one slightly different formula has been used which, if
employed in this case, would result in a lower comparative
disparity figure. &££, e.g.. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d
27, 23 (1st Cir. 1984), ££JLt. denifijdr 104 S.Ct. 2179.
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that "in such a circumstance [it] distorts
reality". Id. at 1249.
726 F.2d at 24. This analysis is particularly applicable to
defendant's argumentf since Hispanics make up a very small
proportion of the population in Salt Lake County.

Using

defendant's figures, there is an absolute disparity of only
2.82%, which is not sufficient to show underrepresentation.
ILaf£llf 726 F.2d at 21 (no underrepresentation where comparative
disparity was 54.2% but absolute disparity was only 2.02%), and
cases cited therein.

See .al££ United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d

422 (10th Cir. 1982) , JC£X±. denied, 455 U.S. 923; State v.
Hilliard. 89 Wash.2d 430, 573 P.2d 22, 28-9 (1977).

Therefore,

the cases cited by defendant in support of his argument are
distinguishable. &££ Jiuien (comparative disparity of
approximately 72% and an absolute disparity of approximately
39%); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 4 82 (1976) (a comparative
disparity of 50.6% and an absolute disparity of 40%); People v.
Harris (comparative disparity of 56.3% for Blacks and 87.7% for
Hispanics, and an absolute disparity of 7.1% for Blacks and 24.2%
for Hispanics).

•

-32-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
convictions should be affirmed.

__££——~~~
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&
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1986.
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